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The preference for sevara over fact in explaining mahlokot is not an
isolated phenomenon. It is clearly related to the broader move in the
yeshiva world towards "lomdus", and my observations, while directed at the
specific question, should also be seen within this broader context. My
remarks are based both on comments heard from my rebbeim, the Rav zt"l and
yibadel lehaim, Rav Aharon Lichtenstein, and on personal experience - my
own and that of other lomdim with whom I have had contact. I would root
the preference for sevara in the belief in (and\or quest for) the eternal
relevance of Torah. Explaining a mahloket on the basis of factual
considerations subjects it to the ravages of facts which are
invented\discovered daily (to paraphrase Rashbam concerning pshat). This
root intuition is expressed on several levels:
1. Concern regarding radical revision of Torah. Examples: the Rav's
vehement rejection of Rabbi Rackman's suggestion that "tav lmeitav tan du
milimeitav armelu" is sociologically conditioned, hence subject to change
in modern society. Imagine commissioning a contemporary chemist to revise
the laws of hagalat kelim in the light of modern scientific knowledge of
bliah and plitah. (Regarding changes in scientific knowledge, many
examples are treated in Neriyah Gutel's Hishtanut HaTvaim BaHalakhah and
sequels in Bekhol Derakhakha Daehu).
2. The intellectual relevance of talmud study for those of us who disagree
with the view recently cited in one Lookjed posting that "he wouldn't
accept that 2+2 = 4 unless confirmed by a gadol", many of the factual
explanations suggested in the gemara and rishonim no longer seem to
correspond to the world as we know and perceive it. Positing a stratum of
sevara beneath the ostensibly factual explanations is necessary to prevent
cognitive dissonance.
3. Factual explanations are both intellectually and spiritually less
satisfying and less challenging than analytical sevarot.
4. It is difficult - at least for the modern mind - to comprehend why
hazal would disagree regarding questions of fact, rather than using
available methods to investigate and resolve the factual issues (as I once
heard: "why didn't they just take a survey?"). The obvious response, that
hazal lacked methods of investigation of these issues, does not enhance
their stature (or relevance) in the eyes of a modern student. Hence, our
reverence for hazal leads us to assume that the factual issue is never
(rarely?) the real core of their discussions and disagreements.
In conclusion, I would note that our discussion of this issue ought to be
divided into two dimensions: the historical question, of what hazal really
thought, and the hermeneutical question, of how we ought to understand
their writings and their message. The relation between these two questions
is - in my view - not a simple one, and requires a separate discussion of
its own.
Avie Walfish</HTML>
