Dear Shalom,
I very much appreciate the responses of current colleagues and former
students to the question I posed a decade ago regarding Eved Kana'ani.
Just to "stir the pot" a bit more, I would like to offer the following
rejoinders to some of the recent postings on this subject:
Steve Bailey suggests that the RaMBaM's approach to sacrifices (Guide
3:46) could serve as a paradigm for assuming "that some social Torah laws
were legislated as temporary edicts". It seems to me that this is mixing
proverbial "apples and oranges", in the sense that Mitzvot Bein Adam
LeChaveiro are not necessarily susceptible to justification from cases of
Mitzvot Bein Adam LaMakom. Ritualistic law is far more often categorized
as Chok than social law, which is understood to constitute Mishpat, i.e.,
logical, rational law. While the Sota ritual by its taking place in the
Beit HaMikdash and serving as a trial by ordeal in the sense that if the
accused is guilty, she would die either sooner or later (Sota 20a; 21a),
implies that here there is a confluence of the two areas of Halacha, the
opposite could also be argued with the Sota ritual serving as a means to
psychologically intimidate the offending party into admit ting her
transgression. (See RaMBaM, Guide 3:40 re Egla Arufa.) Furthermore, why is
RaMBaM preferred over RaMBaN's withering critique of RaMBaM's view re
sacrifices in his comments to VaYikra 1:9?
As far as R. Hirsch's assertion that every law reflects a set of values (I
would take RaMBaN and RaMBaM's side of the argument regarding Ta'amei
HaMitzvot, i.e., that values underlie both Mishpatim and Chukim as
well--see RaMBaN on Devarim 22:6), I certainly don't disagree. However,
identifying the value does not remove the problematic of recognizing that
this is a law "on the books". Whereas regarding Ben Sorer U'Moreh and Ihr
HaNidachat the Talmud states "Lo Haya VeLo Nivra" or perhaps there was a
single case (Sanhedrin 71a), no such assertion is made with regard to Sota
or Eved Kena'ani. If the law was purely a theoretical construct, that
would be one thing, but if it is meant to be enacted and no evidence is
given that it was not, then it seems to me that the reality has to be
grappled with.
I feel that Asher Altshul is being a bit too glib in his assertions about
how ChaZaL and Tora SheB'Al Peh have to, and already have adjusted to
changing social and economic orders. Particularly when it comes to Mitzvot
Mi'D'Orayta, which slavery and Sota happen to be, to be "Oker Davar Min
HaTora" is not something to be taken lightly. Hillel HaZaken displayed
great courage in creating Pruzbul; the Heter Iska was not something that
everyone necessarily approved of; Rabbeinu Gershom had to have great
status in the Jewish Halachic world in order to prohibit polygamy for
Ashkenazim, etc. The best that RaMBaM does with slavery (Hilchot Avadim
9:8) is to advocate that masters be kind to their Avadim and in that way
emulate HaShem. Could not a great Posek during the medieval period not
summarily stated that it is inappropriate to own other human beings? Is
it only a modern sensibility that regards slavery as inherently immoral,
rather than only when it is abusive and sadistic? In fact, the rationale
that resonates with me with regard to the continuation of slavery as well
as monarchy as Halachic categories, is because these are the metaphors
ubiquitously invoked for the relationship between ourselves and the
Divine, i.e., we should feel ourselves as slaves--not mere servants of
HaShem. Furthermore, the Malchiyot of Rosh HaShana, as well as the text of
blessings and other prayers wherein God is referred to as our King
requires us to preserve an idea of kingship and the relationship of a
monarch's servants to their ruler. But whereas we posit that HaShem is a
Benevolent King who does not deal with His Creatures BeTironya, can the
same be said for masters who are Basar VeDam and therefore subject to the
shortcomings and excesses that have categorized so much of human behavior
since man's inception?
Although a metaprinciple underlying religious behavior is VeHalachta
B'Derachav, we still make a distinction between Keil Nekamot HaShem on the
one hand, and the prohibition Lo Tikom, because we don't assume that man
is able, like HaShem, to dispassionately and appropriately respond in kind
to those who have wronged him. Should we then trust man with respect to
slavery?
Finally, Moshe Shoshan suggests that presenting these issues without
necessarily resolving contradictions is a valuable educational experience.
I certainly agree. Yet I can't help but be concerned about those students
who rather than being stimulated and challenged by what might appear at
least for the time being to be irreconcilable competing values, will
instead consider themselves to be the ultimate measure of all things and
walk away disturbed and even "turned off" by what they have learned.
Particularly during the adolescent years, things tend to be viewed in
black-and-white terms, relegating the grey to being viewed as frustrating
and of little interest. If we are to teach our students "BaAsher Hu Sham",
then these are issues that have to be thoroughly considered and
educational strategies devised.
Sincerely,
Yaakov Bieler
Silver Spring, Md
