I read with interest several responses to Rabbi Bieler's query about
slavery, each of whom suggested (perhaps with an allusion to Rambam's
statement about Korbanot in the Moreh), that the Torah's laws of slavery
were meant as a "least of all evils" approach in a society in which
slavery was a given.
This issue was discussed a few years ago on Lookjed (I believe in response
to a query originally posted by me), and a number of people gave similar
answers back then.
My question now is as it was then: if the Torah didn't really view slavery
as an ideal, how does one explain the law (derived by Chazal from the
verse "L'Olam Bahem Taavodu" - Vayikra 25:46) that one who owns a
non-Jewish slave is PROHIBITED from freeing him?
Any insights would be welcome.
