The good news is that there are so many educators that carefully and
thoroughly read the postings on Lookjed! The bad news is that posts are
often misunderstood by over-interpretation.
Three readers (Jack Bieler, Avi Billet and Pesach Wolicki) take exception
to my phrase:
"I start with the assumption (based on the Rambam's understanding of the
nature of sacrifices) that some social Torah laws were legislated as
temporary edicts,"
Admittedly, as I re-read it, the statement needed more clarification on my
part. I meant that I was making my own assumption (not implying the RambaM
as a proof-text) about some morally problematic social laws, based on
reasoning similar to the RambaM on korbanot (a chok): that some
ritual/social laws may be understood best if one separates the eternal
moral teaching behind the law from its actual application within an ANE
cultural context. The RambaM's explanation in the Moreh of the
"compromising" nature of korbanot argued that the Bnai Yisrael could not
abruptly switch from the mode of animal sacrifice to verbal worship of an
abstract Deity. Eventually, they would move to the "mature" mode of
prayer. [The modern analogy would be if we appeared in shul on Shabbat and
the Rabbi said we are not praying today from the siddur, but rather
whirling (like dervishes) until we achieve connection to God. Then we make
kiddush and go home! That wouldn't work too well as a spiritual
experience.] I agree with R. Woliki that the RambaM unequivocally states
in the Yad that actual animal korbanot will be re-instituted in the
future. Perhaps, we'll see what the moshiach announces at the time
--
but that doesn't change his philosophical thinking (not halakhik ruling)
as presented in the Moreh.
Using that reasoning, I suggest that laws of sota, slavery, child
marriage, yifat toar, etc, were not the ideal moral teaching for an
eternal, applied law, but served to humanize the existent practices, which
in biblical context, represented a contrast to pagan values and practices
(like the inhumane treatment of slaves and captives). And that, similar to
changing the mode of worship, the complete outlawing of these practices
would not have been accepted at the time and would not have taught the
Torah's eternal moral ethic. Moreover, the moral values expressed in these
laws have eternal value as precedent for new, applied laws that are
legislated by authorized authorities as responsa in subsequent centuries.
I am "on the road" and don't have access to my library to bring source
texts (for example, evidence of the inhumane pagan practices relating to
slaves, captives, children and suspected adulteresses), but I believe my
distinction between the moral teaching behind the law versus the actual
application of the law, is not an unacceptable position to suggest to
students when teaching these morally difficult topics.
Steve Bailey, Ph.D.
